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income and poverty diffusion to the detriment of households with disabled members. 
We propose an exogenous explanation: the replacement ratio between disability 
benefits and expected labour income shows that disability benefits do not compensate 
the potential incomes of the disabled person and of the possible carer, except in 
households with severe socio economic disadvantages. We also propose an endogenous 
explanation: applying a logit model we show that the labour market participation of the 
possible carer is reduced in households with disabled persons. In order to increase the 
income of the households with disabled members, policy recommendations include the 
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educational opportunities for households at greatest disadvantage.
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DISABILITY IN ITALIAN HOUSEHOLDS: 
INCOME, POVERTY AND LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION
1. INTRODUCTION
Successful redistributive policies, whether they operate through transfer systems or
through provision and pricing of welfare services, rely on information about which 
particular groups are the most appropriate targets. In Italy recent studies on inequality 
and poverty have concentrated on households with minors and households with 
pensioners, and demonstrated that both groups of households are at particular risk of 
poverty (e.g. Cannari and Franco, 1997; Baldini and Mazzaferro, 2001). We are not 
aware of any study concentrating on the economic situations of households with at least 
one disabled member, even though these households share with the previous ones the
need for a high provision of caring services, and a possibly reduced earning ability of 
household members. In addition, the economic situation of households with disabled 
members could be particularly serious, on two grounds: child care has a predictable
time horizon, so that, according to the characteristics of the labour market, the carer is 
free to participate in the labour market when the child reaches school age, while in the 
case of disability caring services are likely to carry on indefinitely; in addition, children 
are by their nature expected to be a source of expenditure, and not of income, while 
disability can also affect people of working age, and therefore the foregone income of 
disabled household members depicts circumstances which are per se unusual. The 
central idea of this paper is that the presence of a disabled member may affect the 
economic situation of the household in two ways: first in terms of increased needs, and 
second in terms of foregone income, both of the disabled, and of other household 
members affected by the situation. In order to assess the adequacy of disability benefits 
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it is therefore essential to consider that the presence of a seriously disabled member
requires caring services which, if provided by another member of the household, 
deprive the household itself of two incomes, i.e. that of the disabled member, and that 
of the carer. The data set is taken from the Bank of Italy’s investigation into “Survey of 
Households Income and Wealth” in 2000 (henceforth SHIW).
The paper unfolds in two steps: first we investigate the financial situation of 
households with (HHD) and without (HHND) disabled members, and we find that on 
average HHD tend to have a lower income, and to be poorer, than HHND. 
Subsequently we provide two explanations for this: one in terms of replacement ratios 
with respect to disability benefits, and another in terms of the probability that the 
household member most likely to provide caring services to the disabled member 
(henceforth the “carer”) participates in the labour market; we assume that the partner of 
the household head, either male or female, is the most likely to fulfil this task, and from 
now on we refer to this figure as the partner. 
Estimates of replacement ratios show that disability benefits are lower than 
expected incomes in most cases, and equal to or even larger than expected incomes in 
cases with relative social disadvantages; also, our logit estimates show that the 
presence of individuals needing care, i.e. disabled members and children, negatively 
affects the labour market participation of the partner, pointing towards a source of 
further reduction in potential household incomes. Therefore our results suggest that the 
presence of a disabled member negatively affects the economic condition of the 
household, when compared with households without disabled members, except in 
extreme situations where all households (both with and without a disabled member) are 
levelled toward the bottom of the socio-economic scale. For these extreme situations 
the income prospects of all the members of the household are very low, and therefore 
fully compensated by disability benefits. According to our results two main 
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mechanisms explain the relative financial disadvantage of HHD. From an exogenous 
point of view, disability benefits are a useful instrument for supporting the income of 
households with disabled members, but offer modest, and in many instances 
insufficient, support to compensate for the foregone income of the disabled person. 
From an endogenous point of view, the presence of a disabled member is likely to 
reduce the labour market participation of at least another household member, 
provoking a further loss in the potential income of the household.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss 
methodology, data, and possible sources of bias; in section 3 we offer comparisons in 
terms of income, and of indicators of poverty, between HHD and HHND, in the actual 
scenario, and in the counterfactual scenario where disability benefits are removed; in 
section 4 we evaluate replacement ratios; in section 5 we present an analysis of the 
probability that the partner of the head of the household (henceforth “partner”) in a 
HHD participates in the labour market; in section 6 we draw some concluding remarks 
and policy recommendations. 
2. METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND POSSIBLE SOURCES OF BIAS
As stated in the previous section, this paper unfolds in two steps; a preliminary analysis 
of the comparison of the financial situation of HHD and HHND in terms of indicators 
of income levels and of poverty; and a second part investigating reasons for the relative 
disadvantage of HHD. This second part analyses replacement ratios with respect to 
disability benefits, in order to assess the extent to which disability benefits compensate 
the household for the loss of potential income related to the disabled member; this 
second part also analyses the impact of disability on the household as a whole, by 
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5
estimating the probability of participation in the labour market of family members 
other than the disabled member . 
In this section we discuss the methodology, the data, and the possible sources and 
direction of bias that some of our choices involve. 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
In the preliminary analysis we wish to test the hypothesis that HHD are at disadvantage 
with respect to HHND in financial terms, because they are expected to have higher 
expenditures, and reduced incomes, not fully compensated by disability benefits1. 
We construct indicators of income and of poverty, calculating them for HHD and 
HHND; the mean values of the indicators for these two groups are compared through 
the t test. Incomes are compared as equivalised incomes2; the transformation from 
nominal to equivalised values is effected on the basis of the widely used equivalence 
scale of Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992)3. The comparison of poverty between 
1
 In this paper we do not undertake an analysis of possible additional expenditures of 
households with disabled member(s). See section 2.3 for a discussion on this point.
2
 Income inequality literature still lacks a definitive equivalence scale devoted to the studies of 
economic conditions of households with disabled members. An attempt has been made by 
INPS (the Italian DSS) to construct an equivalence factor, ISE (Indicator of the Economic 
Situation), which attributes a particular weight to households with disabled members; however, 
the ISE is based on capital as well as on income, so it is not suited to our purpose of comparing 
incomes.
3 NYYeq =  where Yeq is equivalised income, Y is household income and N is the number of 
household members. In a previous version of this paper, we also used the OECD equivalence 
scale, which attributes different weights to the household head, other adults, and children, and 
we obtained the same results.
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HHD and HHND is drawn in terms of the standard4 indicators of poverty, i.e. the index 
of diffusion5 and of intensity6 of poverty, defining the poverty line for a family of two 
in terms of mean equivalised income.
Estimates of the replacement ratio are calculated as the ratio between disability 
benefits and expected labour income. Likelihood estimators are used to obtain a mean 
value of disability benefits and of wages. Expected labour income is calculated 
multiplying the mean wage by the probability of participating in the labour market and 
by the probability of finding a job, i.e. the complement to unemployment rate. 
Replacement ratios are calculated with respect to area of residence and gender 
variables, in order to reduce within group heterogeneity.
Finally, the partner participation equation is estimated by a logit model for cross-
sectional data. Explanatory variables include demographic and family characteristics 
(including a dummy variable identifying the presence of a disabled member in the 
household), labour market characteristics and income variables, in order to calculate 
substitution, cross-substitution and income effects. In order to impute earnings also to 
not-participant partners, and to calculate substitution effects, a Heckman selection 
model is used, avoiding sample selection problems in the wage prediction.
2.2 DATA
Our data is taken from the Bank of Italy’s 2000 survey (Survey of Italian Households 
Income and Wealth, SHIW), which includes 22268 individuals, of which 615 (2.76%) 
4
 See for instance Atkinson (1970).
5
 Diffusion of poverty: d = q/N where q and N are respectively the number of poor people and 
the total number of individuals considered.
6
 Intensity of poverty I =  (yi – z) / q * z where yi, z, and q are respectively the income of 
individual I, the poverty line, and the number of poor people.
Page 6 of 37
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
7
are disabled, and 8001 households, of which 566 (7.07%) have at least one disabled 
member.
SHIW data are widely used even though they are affected by well-known problems, 
such as non-answers and possible imprecision in answers7. A short description of the 
sub-samples used respectively in the income and in the participation analysis is 
provided in the sections on empirical analysis (3.1 and 5.2). It was not the purpose of 
the SHIW set of data to collect information on disability8; therefore the data do not 
allow us to quantify the degree of impairment, which could be important in analysing 
the effect on the household of a person’s disability9. However, we believe that this set 
7
 For a critical analysis of the limitations of SHIW data see e.g. Brandolini and Cannari (1994).
8
 The Bank of Italy’s 2000 questionnaire, created by Ipsos-Explorer, asks in question 2 of 
frame B5 “What sort of pension do you receive?”. In this paper we define as disabled those 
who reply to this question by crossing “disability pension” among the alternatives listed. It 
should be noted that the rubric “disability pension” includes both the real disability pension and 
the disability cheque, which are both tied to the individual’s ability to work and pay tax, and 
also includes pensions of disability and of companionship, received for psycho-physical 
characteristics, whatever the work done and the contributions paid (more details to be found 
e.g. in Seghieri 2003, 26-40 and 540-75); this is the reason why in the article we refer to 
“disability benefits”. The Appendix describes the sections and the questions of the 
questionnaire which we used, and the problems pertaining to the choice of data.
9
 The 1995 SHIW questionnaire does include more specific questions on the nature of the 
disability benefits received. European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data provide 
information on the individual and the family; in the section “HEALTH”, question 157 deals 
with one’s assessment of one’s own state of health, and questions 158-9 refer specifically to 
“any chronic physical or mental health problems, illness or disability”, also in relationship to 
how they affect daily activities. Using ECHP information would allow us to grade the level of 
impairment, but at the level of subjective assessment, and without distinguishing between “any 
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8
of data is the best one in Italy for obtaining information on the disabled and on their 
family, rather than on the disabled only10. We have therefore to adopt the receipt of
disability benefits as the pragmatic criterion for defining disability. We are aware that 
in so doing we are likely to come across errors of both type 1 and type 2, i.e. excluding 
the bona fide disabled and including the spurious ones. However, we are reasonably 
confident of a small probability of committing error type 1, because in Italy a very 
large majority of disabled people now receive disability benefits11. In addition, it seems 
likely that the probability of committing error type 1, however small, applies mainly to 
households in situations of social disadvantage, characterized by a low social and 
educational level, because of their difficulties in dealing with bureaucracy (this point is 
further discussed in section 2.3). 
The effect of adopting our pragmatic definition of disability is more serious for the 
probability of committing error type 2. On this point we have two reflections about our 
choice: first, in Italy the overall percentage of the population with disability appears to 
be comparable with the % of disabled observed in other European countries. Also, for 
the purpose of avoiding a possible source of over-representation of the disabled, we 
only consider recipients of disability benefits of working age, excluding individuals 
chronic physical or mental health problems, illness” and “disability”. On balance we opted for 
using the SHIW data, which, by providing information about the recipients of disability 
benefits, identify disabled people officially certified as such (for a discussion of the desirability 
of self evaluation or objective measures of ill health see Bound (1991)).
10
 For a source of data on the Italian situation of the disabled, but not of their family, see the 
site www.disabilitaincifre.it  set up by ISTAT, the Italian National Institute of Statistics.
11
 Since the introduction of Bill 104 /1992, stating the rights of the officially registered 
disabled, the % of registered disabled, all of whom receive at least some disability benefits, has 
steadily increased, reaching more or less a plateau in recent years.
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9
who may receive disability benefits which are in effect income support for elderly 
people12.
In analysing data closely tied to income (i.e. nominal income, equivalised income, 
indexes of inequality and poverty), we refer exclusively to households in which no 
household member is self-employed13; this restriction is necessary because information 
on income provided by self-employed workers is notoriously unreliable. By contrast, 
our econometric labour market participation analysis includes self-employed partners, 
for three reasons: first, this allows us to include the participation in the labour market 
of household members with flexible and non-formal income-earning activities. Second, 
statements about participation are not affected by the income unreliability of the self-
employed; third, in the econometric analysis we include predicted rather than declared
incomes of self-employed workers, hence less affected by possible under reporting.
2.3 POSSIBLE SOURCES OF BIAS
In what follows we list the main sources of possible bias, grouping them by our choice 
of the sample, by the calculation of replacement ratios, and by participation analysis.
If, as suggested above, the probability of committing error type 1 is higher for 
households at social disadvantage, then particularly low incomes characterize the 
excluded households with disabled members, and this leads us to underestimate income 
and poverty diffusion gaps.
12
 In Italy the practice of assigning disability benefits as a form of income support to elderly 
people who have no other pension is not uncommon. See section 3 for a further discussion of 
the reasons for using this criterion for choosing our sample.
13
 Therefore we include only households whose members belong to one or more of the 
following categories: employees, pensioners, the unemployed, and persons not belonging to the 
labour market.
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Our criterion for identifying disability also has implications for the estimate of the 
partner’s probability of participation, in different ways according to whether error type 
1 or 2 is committed; in the case of error type 1 some HHD partners (characterized by a 
lower participation rate) are classified as HHND partners, involving therefore an under-
estimation of the participation rate of HHND partners; the reverse is true in the case of 
error type 2. In addition, the estimation of the participation rate of HHD partners is 
likely to be biased by the lack of knowledge of the level of disability; in particular, it is 
overestimated if the disabled person suffers from a minor disability not requiring a 
particularly high level of care. 
The value of replacement ratios is biased upwards, as it is calculated on the basis of 
disability benefits, which are not taxable, and incomes, which in the SHIW data are net 
of taxes. Our conclusions about the (low) level of replacement ratios would be even 
stronger if replacement ratios were calculated on the basis of gross incomes.
In this paper we do not take into account possible additional expenditures of 
households with at least one disabled member. The analysis would involve a careful 
investigation of how much of the possible additional expenditures are covered, perhaps 
in kind, by public provision. Should the analysis reveal, as we suspect, higher net 
expenditures in HHD than in HHND, our results would underestimate the relative 
financial disadvantages of HHD with respect to HHND.
By only considering households with household heads of working age, we lose the 
observations where household partners are of working age even though household 
heads are not, and this may affect the results in the probability of participation analysis. 
However, the number of such observations is small, and these are likely to be equally 
distributed between HHD and HHND, so no significant bias is likely to arise out of this 
sample selection criterion.
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3. INCOME INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
In this section we investigate whether the presence of a disabled member has an impact 
on the financial situation of the household; for this purpose we compare the financial 
situation of HHD and HHND with respect to incomes and poverty, in the actual 
scenario, and in the counterfactual scenario where disability benefits have been 
removed. Our analysis concerns a group of 4108 households (descriptive statistics are 
reported in table 1), out of which 210 have at least one disabled member; households 
are grouped according to idiosyncratic characteristics of the household head14. 
3.1 ACTUAL SCENARIO
First, we test the significance of the difference in mean equivalised incomes between 
HHD and HHND, nation-wide, and by area of residence, comparing households by 
gender and by educational level of the household head. Results are reported in table 2.
For aggregate, nationwide data, and also for the Centre-North, a comparatively 
prosperous area in the country, HHD’s incomes are significantly lower than HHND’s, 
and this is equally true across the whole sample, both by disaggregating households by 
household head gender and by considering those with high levels of education; 
however, in the South, an area characterized by low wages and high unemployment, 
14
 The analysis in terms of income and indicators of poverty, for reasons anticipated before, 
only considers households with heads below sixty five. In fact 52% of disabled are aged at least 
65, compared with 16% of non disabled; a more detailed break down of the sample in elderly 
people and disabled, needed to avoid the risk of confusing the income situation of disabled with 
that of elderly people, would make the sample too small.
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differences in incomes between HHD and HHND are never significant; interestingly, 
the same results are found when household heads have low education, even though 
they live in prosperous areas. Both situations, living in the South, and being poorly 
educated, correspond to high relative disadvantage, characterized by low wages and 
high unemployment rates; in these situations of socio economic disadvantage, disability 
benefits bring the HHD mean equivalised income up to the level of the HHND’s. We 
show in section 4, where we investigate replacement ratios with respect to disability 
benefits, that in these situations the incomes foregone by households because of 
disability are extremely low, so that on average disability benefits have a completely 
perequative effect, despite the fact that, as we show in section 5, households with 
disabled members are likely to forego more than one income. For households with 
household heads living in the South and with low education, the observed phenomenon 
is even stronger, as foregone incomes are so low that disability benefits on average 
make HHD better off than HHND. Thus HHD are only as well off as, or better off than, 
HHND, in situations where average incomes are very low anyway.
Poverty is defined in this paper in quasi relative terms, in terms of poverty line15, 
defined as the half of mean equivalised income calculated over the group of all
households without any self employed worker. As shown in table 3 the diffusion of 
poverty takes a value similar to the whole sample, about 15%, for HHND, while it 
reaches 20% for HHD, and the difference is statistically significant. The higher 
diffusion of poverty among HHD compared to HHND is highly significant in 
households with a female household head. This evidence can, at least partially, be 
explained in terms of potential income losses of male partners in HHD. In fact, given 
our assumption that care is provided by the partner and given the earning gender 
15
 As usual in poverty analysis, the poverty line is defined for the whole sample. According to 
SHIW data it is 14776.32 liras, and 16.26% of the households are poor.
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differences, if the partner is male the income loss is potentially larger compared to the 
case in which the partner is female. On the other hand, other sub-groups show a larger 
diffusion of poverty for HHD, but differences from  HHND are not significant. 
Between group differences in terms of household head characteristics show 
expected divergences. With or without disabled members, households with adverse 
characteristics, i.e. low educational level, female household heads, and living in the 
South, show a larger diffusion of poverty. In such cases wage discrimination, 
differences in labour market participation and in unemployment rates provide 
reasonable explanations. In fact, all the adverse characteristics considered correspond 
to a lower participation rate and wage, and a higher unemployment rate, implying a 
potential reduction in household income, hence a larger poverty diffusion. 
As shown again by table 3, no significant difference in the intensity of poverty 
between HHD and HHND is found. This is consistent with the results summarized in 
table 3: in situations of relative socio economic disadvantage, disability benefits are 
just sufficient to produce small and not significant differences in income between HHD 
and HHND because, as we show in sections 4 and 5, replacement ratios are high, given 
the very low expected values of the household incomes foregone because of disability. 
Besides, smaller values in the intensity index for HHD show for this household type a 
within group perequative effect16. In fact, a source of HHD income (disability benefits) 
is characterized by a smaller variance distribution compared to other income sources, 
implying a smaller inequality in the income distribution of poor households.
The situation is confirmed if we introduce fuzzy areas, i.e. we include the quasi 
poor, defined as those whose equivalised income ranges between 50% and 60% of 
equivalised income, which corresponds to 100% and 120% of the poverty line. In this 
16
 This finding is also confirmed by the analysis of the whole sample, observing the Gini 
concentration coefficient estimates (see table 4). 
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case the diffusion of poverty among HHD rises from 20 % to 29%, and among HHND 
rises from 15% to 24%. A recurrent theme in these results is the disparity in conditions 
according to areas of residence. This is confirmed by the distribution of the diffusion of 
poverty in the various situations. According to table 3 above, 8% of HHD are poor in 
the Centre-North, and 37% of HHD are poor in the South. The situation deteriorates if
we include the quasi poor: in that case 12% of HHD are poor in the Centre-North, and 
52% of HHD are poor in the South. Still according to table 3 above, approximately 6% 
of HHND are poor in the Centre-North, and this grows to 10% if we include the quasi 
poor, while approximately 33% of HHND are poor in the South, and this grows to 48% 
if we include the quasi poor. Less dramatic than the area effect, but still very 
substantial, is the effect of level of the level of education on poverty, which becomes 
more conspicuous than in table 3 once the quasi poor are included. For brevity we do 
not show these results.
3.2 COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIO
In order further to assess the role of disability benefits in reducing inequality between 
HHD and HHND, the comparisons of incomes and of poverty indicators among HHD 
and HHND has been repeated on the counterfactual assumptions that HHD are 
deprived of disability benefits17.
17
 At a theoretical level, the removal of disability benefits is treated as an income effect, with 
consequences for the observed choices in terms of consumption and leisure; our hypothesis of 
no change in behaviour in the counterfactual scenario implies the logically not excludable case 
in which the household working time is unaffected by the removal of disability benefits. At an 
operational level, our proposed methodology is widely used: for instance at point 7 of part 1 in 
European Commission (2003-2005), the perequative effect of social cash transfers is assessed 
calculating the poverty risk by just comparing the distribution of income with and without 
Page 14 of 37
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15
In the counterfactual analysis both the differences between HHD and HHND both in 
equivalised income and in the indicators of poverty turn out to be highly significant, 
and to the detriment of HHD, in all cases. 
For brevity we report in table 5 only the differences between HHD and HHND in 
the indicators of poverty at national level. The interpretation of the findings is intuitive:
HHD, whose income is reduced in the counterfactual analysis, are a minority in the 
whole group, therefore the poverty line has changed very little; HHD, with their 
reduced income, have largely fallen below the nearly unchanged poverty line. 
These findings show the importance of disability benefits in reducing inequality 
between HHD and HHND, even if, as anticipated, only partially; in fact, by removing 
disability benefits for HHD, a large increase in the diffusion and intensity of poverty is 
found. In particular, the intensity of poverty highly increases because, removing a 
source of income characterized by small variance, the remaining sources of income 
display larger within group inequality.
3.3 SECTION SUMMARY
This section has highlighted the inadequacy of disability benefits to level the income 
and poverty situations of HHD compared with HHND, except in situations of high 
socio economic disadvantage: living in the South, poor level of education, and 
households with a female head. In the next two sections we provide explanations for 
the findings of the present section, both in terms of exogenous factors (section 4) and 
of endogenous factors (section 5).
social cash transfers; however, the Commission itself warns that this indicator must be taken 
with caution, as it assumes “all other thing equal”.
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4. REPLACEMENT RATIO BETWEEN SALARY AND DISABILITY 
BENEFITS
Preliminary estimates in the previous section have shown heterogeneous income and 
poverty gaps between HHD and HHND. In order to explore the hypothesis that 
disability benefits compensate for HHD foregone incomes only in situations of 
socioeconomic disadvantage, we calculate the replacement ratio between disability 
benefits and salary, by area and by gender of the household head .The results are 
presented in table 6.
Salary is calculated as the mean salary per employee, consistently with our choice 
to exclude households containing self employed members; the replacement ratio is 
calculated both on the mean salary, and on the expected mean salary; the latter depends 
on the participation rate and on the employment rate18.
However replacement ratios are calculated, it is clear that disability benefits are 
fundamental to support the income of households with a disabled member. But how 
adequate is this support?
Whether replacement ratios are calculated on the basis of the mean salary or of the 
expected mean salary, values in columns (f) and (g) of table 6 show that disability 
benefits only partially replace the relevant salary, except if the partner is a woman 
living in the South. In all other cases the replacement is only partial, with different 
degrees of coverage; it is always less than 50% if the basis of calculation is the mean 
salary, whatever the characteristics of the disabled, i.e. man or woman, living in the 
Centre-North or in the South. If calculated on the basis of the expected mean salary, the 
replacement ratio remains below 50% if the disabled member  is a male living in the 
18
 This is the criterion used by the European Union to define employment rates.
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Centre-North, and it rises to just over three quarters if the disabled member is a man 
living in the South; if the disabled member is a woman, the replacement ratio shows 
that disability benefits nearly compensate the expected mean income if she lives in the 
Centre-North, and even doubles it if she lives in the South. 
These considerations apply if the replacement ratio only takes into account the 
potential earnings foregone by the disabled member. However, as we pointed out in the 
introduction, a key  novelty of our paper is to consider the effects of disability in the 
full household context. Further considerations are therefore necessary in order to assess 
the perequative effect of disability benefits. The estimates we develop in section 5 
show that in HHD the presence of a disabled member reduces the partner’s probability
of participation compared with HHND; therefore it is likely that the presence of a 
disabled member implies two foregone incomes rather than one, i.e. that of the disabled
member, and that of the carer. In the light of these considerations, replacement ratios 
appear to be inadequate fully to compensate HHD for foregone incomes. The only 
exception concerns the case of a household in the South with a disabled female. Does 
this mean that in the South the presence of a disabled female does not affect the 
household income? The simple affirmative answ r conceals the fact that, as we have 
repeatedly shown, the South is characterized by high poverty, high unemployment and 
low incomes, and therefore very low mean and expected mean incomes, so it is not the 
disability benefits which are high, but it is the incomes they replace which are very 
low.
This investigation into the values of replacement ratios taking into account 
idiosyncratic characteristics contributes to explain our findings in section 1, according 
to which the differences between HHD’s and HHND’s mean equivalised incomes are 
small and not significant in situations of relative socio economic disadvantage, but are 
significant in all other circumstances. 
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5. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBABILITY OF THE PARTNER’S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET
In this section we provide a possible explanation for inequality between HHD and 
HHND, testing for an endogenous reason. We continue to develop the analysis taking 
into account the situation of the disabled member within the context of the household, 
rather than of the disabled member in isolation. In particular we explore whether the 
presence of the disabled member affects the behaviour of other family members; in fact 
the carer is likely to be partially or fully prevented from participating in the labour 
market. On the assumption stated in section 1, that the carer is the partner, we apply a 
logit model to test whether the presence of a disabled member reduces the probability 
of the partner’s labour market participation. This analysis is quite novel, as work has 
been done on the participation in the labour market of women with young children19, 
and on the participation of disabled people themselves in the labour market20, but no 
work has been done to estimate the effect of a disabled member on the participation in 
the labour market of another household member.
5.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
The theoretical model on which we base our econometric specification assumes that the 
decisions are taken by the household as a unit; therefore all decisions are taken 
simultaneously, so that all maximizing variables are interdependently determined.
19
 For instance, Chevalier and Viitanen (2002) find that the participation of women in the 
labour market is negatively affected by the presence of children under 5. 
20
 See for instance Madden (2004) and Gruber J. (2000). See also Orlando and Patrizi (2006).
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Households determine their optimal choices in terms of labour supply (participation) 
and consumption, maximizing a utility function, subject to time and budget constraints:
( )
0
0
..
,,,,max

>
=+
+=
=
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ii
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L
pCVHw
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where U is the utility function of the household, C is the household consumption, 
subscript i=1,2 refers to the household head (1) and to the partner (2), L is leisure 
(including time devoted to housework and care), J is a vector of personal 
characteristics, Zh is a vector of household characteristics, Zm is a vector of labour 
market characteristics, T is the total time available, assumed to be the same for both 
individuals, H is the time spent in working on the labour market, w is the labour market 
wage, V is unearned income (that includes non labour income of the household head 
and of the spouse, plus the incomes of other household members), and p is the price of 
the consumption good.
The complete set of first order conditions, including the Kuhn-Tucker conditions,
provides a system of simultaneous equations and solutions, that for brevity we do not 
present. Here we concentrate on the partner’s choice: there is an interior solution, i.e. 
the hours worked in the labour market are positive, if the labour market wage for the 
partner is higher than his/her reservation wage (wr), i.e. w2>wr; this is also the 
condition for participation. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the marginal utility of the partner’s leisure is 
larger for those who provide care to a disabled household member than for those who 
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do not; therefore the model allows for a larger reservation wage and a smaller 
participation rate for partners providing care.
In our empirical analysis first a Heckman selection model is estimated, then the 
resultant coefficients are used to predict a wage rate for the partners who do not work21. 
Otherwise, it would be implicitly stated that the expected market wage rate of the non-
workers is zero, which is likely to result in the wage variable being highly significant 
and the significance of other variables being reduced22. The Heckman (1979) procedure 
is a response to the potential effects of participation selection bias, which arises when 
interest centers on the relationship between x and w but data are available only for 
cases in which another variable, s*, exceeds a certain value. The earnings equation of 
interest for all participants is: wi* = xi’ + i and the selection equation is given by: si*
= zi
’	 + ui, where labour is supplied when si* > 0; and thus ui > - zi’. The error terms 
are assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with means 0 and variances µ = 1 
and , and correlation coefficient . Therefore, in the sample selection model we 
estimate: E[wi* | xi, si* >0] = xi’ + 
 (- z’	)23.
Our participation analysis assumes that each partner faces a given market wage at 
which he/she can choose to work any number of hours (H), or none (see Layard, Barton 
and Zabalza, 1980). As anticipated, if w rises above wr, the partner will supply some 
hours. Thus for H > 0 the supply function is:
21
 Estimates of the Heckman selection model are presented in table 8.
22
 Some authors (for example Bailey, 2003) predict the market wage using the Tobit model, 
others using an OLS regression. The Tobit model constructs an independent variable which is 
usually bounded by zero and infinity, and typically coefficients so obtained are larger in 
absolute value than those from an OLS regression. However, both techniques can involve 
biased estimates whenever sample selection problems arise.
23 (-z’	) = (-w	) / (1-(-w	)) is the inverse Mills ratio.
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 += 'QH
where Q is a set of covariates. We indicate:
'ˆ QH =
which may well be negative for someone whose measured characteristics do not 
dispose them to work. Finally:



+
>++=
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The probability of working is:
( ) ( ) ( )HFHHP ˆ1ˆPr0ˆPr =>=>+= 
where F is the cumulative density function of . Every individual has a participation 
probability defined as follow:



+
>+=
)ˆ(y  probabilit   with 0ˆif0
)ˆ(1y  probabilit   with 0ˆif1
HFH
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pi 

In particular, the participation decision is estimated by a logit model, hence F is 
assumed to be a logistic. The logit specification is the follow:
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5.2 RESULTS
The regression estimates the rates of participation in the labour market of the partners 
in the households sampled by SHIW, with personal, household, income, and labour 
market characteristics as explanatory variables. A group of 4236 individuals has been 
identified, made up of all the partners in working age24, including the self-employed. 
Participants are defined as the employed, the strictly unemployed, and the first job 
seekers; everybody else has been defined as non participant. Covariates used are: 
partner’s predicted annual labour income, household head’s annual labour income, 
family annual unearned income, age and age square, two regional dummies (North and 
South, the omitted category is Centre), a continuous variable for education, a gender 
dummy, a set of dummy variables in order to indicate the presence of disabled persons, 
pre-schooled aged children, elderly people and, finally, the unemployment rate, defined 
in sixteen different groups related to personal characteristics (age, education, gender 
and region). The descriptive statistics relating to this sample are described in table 7. 
The second column of table 9 shows the results of the logit analysis, the third
column reports the standard errors, while the fifth column shows the marginal effect of 
an increase of a unit in the covariate values on participation, evaluated at the mean of 
the dependent variable. Finally, in table 10 we show observed and predicted 
participation rates, while in table 11 we show the estimates of the elasticities. 
24
 Working age for participation analysis diverges between men and women. We fixed it at 65 
years for men and 60 years for women, in accordance with Italian retirement legislation.
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In table 9, the estimates of the covariates’ coefficients have the expected signs, 
except the North dummy (but the estimate is not significant). Our estimates of the age 
variable predict a typical inverted U effect on participation, and they are significant at 
5% and 1% level. One extra year of education increases the participation probability by 
2,7%, and the estimate is significant at 1% level. With regard to area dummies, the 
North dummy is not significant, while an individual living in the South has a 
probability of participation about 19% less than someone with the same characteristics 
but not living in the South. As we can expect, the relative probability of participation in
the labour market for males is 41% greater than for females. The unemployment rate 
negatively affects the partner’ participation, and points in the direction of the 
behavioural hypothesis of the discouraged worker. The presence of preschool-aged 
children negatively affects the partner’s participation probability (about 9,2%), the 
presence of children 6-14 years old has a negative effect (about 7,6%) on the 
participation decision, while the presence of elderly members affects it positively 
(about 9%). The estimates of income variables are all 1% significant and show the 
expected signs. Finally, the presence of disabled members, as expected, negatively 
affects participation, but the estimate is not significant. 
As pointed out in section 1, our criterion for identifying disabled persons is likely to 
involve some bias in the estimation of the participation decision of the partner. 
However, given that the most relevant identification problem relates to type 2 errors 
rather than to type 1 errors, our choice criterion involves the underestimation of the 
effect of the presence of disabled members on the participation decision of the partner.
A further consideration seems to be necessary: we suggested in section 1 that the 
effect of the presence of disabled members on the partner’s probability of participation 
is very similar to the effect of the presence of other individuals needing care, i.e. pre-
school aged children. In other words, this last variable can be used as a proxy in order 
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to capture the effect of the presence of members needing care, including disabled
members, on participation rates. Our estimates show a negative and significant effect of 
the children 0-5 variable, strengthening our predictions of the effect of disabled, or 
other care-needing members, on participation rates. 
Our findings are confirmed by the predicted participation rate. Table 10 displays
the observed and predicted participation rates: the predicted and the observed 
participation rates show a strong and significant difference between HHD and HHND 
(35.2% versus 59.6%). Hence, even if the estimate of the disabled variable is not 
significant, the participation rate appears to be affected by the presence of disabled
members.
With regard to income variables, in table 11 we present the substitution, cross-
substitution and income effects. As anticipated, all effects are significant and show the 
expected signs. Our elasticity estimates confirm an indirect negative effect related to 
disabled members. In fact, all elasticities show smaller absolute values for HHD 
partners compared with HHND. These results confirm that the presence of disabled 
members can represent an obstacle (or a disincentive) to partners’ labour market 
participation. In particular, the substitution effect is 0.31 for HHD partners, while it is 
0.33 for HHND. With predicted increasing own earnings the participation rate 
increases, but the effect is less strong. At the same time, cross-substitution effects are 
negative but these effects are stronger for HHD than for HHND partners (-0.10 versus -
0.08). We obtain the same results for the income effects (-0.12 for HHD partners versus 
-0.07 for HHND). In other words, HHD partners show a relatively more rigid 
probability of participation with respect to increases in their own earnings, while their 
probability of participation is more elastic with respect to increases in household head 
earnings and in unearned income.
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5.3 SECTION SUMMARY
In this section we have provided a possible theoretical explanation for HHD partners’
observed lesser participation in the labour market. Our empirical tests, applying a logit 
model and comparing observed and predicted participation rates, seem to confirm 
theoretical predictions, i.e. a negative effect of the presence of disabled members on 
partners’ participation decisions. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND POLICIES
The paper has proposed a fresh approach to the study of the economics of disability, by 
analysing the disabled within the household context, rather than in isolation, with the 
methodology discussed in sections 1 and 2. 
The first part of our analysis (section 3) offers original findings on the relative 
financial situations of households with and without disabled members; it has been 
shown that on average HHD have lower income than HHND, that all HHD would be 
severely disadvantaged if disability benefits were removed, that in general the diffusion 
of poverty is higher among HHD than among HHND, and that disability benefits are 
sufficient to close the income gap between HHD and HHND only in the lowest socio 
economic brackets, where mean and expected incomes are very low.
The analysis in section 4 shows that the relation between disability benefits and 
expected income varies widely across circumstances, i.e. areas and gender. Given that 
disability benefits are the same throughout the country, different values of replacement 
ratios depend on expected labour incomes; obviously, replacement ratios are largest in 
areas where expected incomes are lowest. 
Section 5 investigates the impact of the disabled on the working behaviour of the 
household. To our knowledge such a study has not been carried out before. The logit 
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model shows that a disabled member in the household reduces the likelihood that the 
partner participates in the labour market; we suggest that this is because the partner acts 
as carer, and we conclude that disability in one member is likely to lose the household 
two incomes, not one only.
These findings of sections 4 and 5 together explain why the incomes of HHD and 
HHND are quite similar in situations of greatest socio economic disadvantage, 
characterized by low wages, employment opportunities and education. If the 
replacement ratio is two, disability benefits compensate for the expected incomes of 
two members, i.e. the disabled member and the carer, so there is no difference between 
the income of households with and without disabled members. However, the smaller 
the replacement ratio, the less disability benefits compensate for the household’s 
foregone incomes (of the disabled member and of the carer): if the replacement ratio is 
one, disability benefits make up for the income of the disabled member, but not of the 
carer, and this already makes HHDs’ income lower than HHND; if the replacement 
ratio is less than one, only part of the disabled member’s foregone income is 
compensated for, and the foregone income of the carer is not replaced at all, so that 
there are even more reasons for HHD incomes to be lower than HHND. To a disabled 
male in the Centre-North in a medium or high income household, disability benefits are 
not even half his expected income, while to a female disabled in the South disability 
benefits are over twice her expected income.
Another important finding of our research is the persistent disadvantage of 
households with low income potential, i.e. with household heads with low education, or 
living in the South, whatever the grouping criteria. In the year 2000, the mean 
equivalised income of both HHD and HHND living in the South was smaller than the 
mean equivalised income of comparable groups living in the Centre-North, while the 
diffusion of poverty in the South is larger than in the Centre-North. The disparity 
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between areas remains large even if in calculating the diffusion of poverty we include
the quasi poor. Analogous considerations with respect to differences in income and 
diffusion of poverty apply when we compare HHD and HHND with household heads 
with different levels of education; income and poverty differences become larger if we 
calculate the diffusion of poverty including the quasi poor. 
Policy implications for the purpose of reducing income disparities between HHD 
and HHND are either an increase in the amount of disability benefits, or an increase in 
the provision of public caring services for the disabled, or a mixture of the two. The 
redistributive effects of these two alternative instruments are different: disability 
benefits are paid through general taxation, while the provision of caring services is
generally the responsibility of local authorities. The amount of provision of caring 
services would therefore depend on how affluent the various local authorities are, while 
an increase in disability benefits would be homogeneous throughout the country. The 
usual problem of the desirability of benefits in cash rather than in kind also arises in 
this context.
Our results also call for deep structural policies not immediately related to 
disability: according to our findings in situations of social disadvantage (whether 
geographical, or in terms of personal characteristics) replacement ratios with respect to 
disability benefits are nearly one, or even higher than one. This simply highlights that 
replacement ratios appear to be very high when the same level of disability benefits is 
compared with very low expected incomes in situations of social disadvantage. These 
low expected incomes, particularly evident in the South, call for policies geared at 
increasing the opportunities of employment, and/or the level of wages, and/or the 
educational qualification of the labour force, or for a mixture of these all. These 
policies would also improve participation rates, given that the analysis developed in 
section 4 points in the direction of the behavioural model of the discouraged worker.
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Much remains to be done in comparing the financial situation of HHD and HHND.
We suggest three directions for future research which would assist in identifying the 
appropriate mix of equitative policies. First, information about degrees of disability is 
desirable; this could perhaps be achieved by combining SHIW and INPS-ISTAT data. 
Second, possible special needs of HHD ought to be explicitly considered, as they may 
result in a vector of expenditures different from HHND, and also, in the long run, in 
less savings and accumulation of capital. Third, it would be desirable to quantify the 
total amount of public transfers in kind provided to HHD to assist with care of the 
disabled member. In this connection, it is highly desirable that the surveys geared at 
gathering information on disability collect data setting the disabled within the 
socioeconomic context to which they belong.
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APPENDIX
The data used in this paper was collected in 2000 by the Bank of Italy for a survey 
which it conducts periodically on the consumption habits of Italian households.
The following SHIW files were used: carcom, containing information about 
characteristics of individuals and households (age, gender, educational level, area of 
residence, type of employment, degree of kinship to head of household, number of 
breadwinners in household, etc.); allb5, from which we identified households 
containing at least one disabled member, and which we used to calculate the annual 
value of disability benefits; rfam, containing information about households’ income; 
allb1, containing information about self-employed workers.
As specified above, all households which declared an income deriving from self-
employment were excluded from the analysis on income and on poverty, so as to 
maximise the reliability of results. This was possible using the information in the rfam 
file.
All individual characteristics of the households (gender, area of residence, 
educational level) are recorded about the head of the household, who is assumed to be 
representative.
By convention, when income was declared to be negative (which happened very 
rarely) we computed it as nought.
We did not include information from HHD households which did not declare the 
monthly value of the disability benefits (this information was important in the 
counterfactual exercise).
In the analysis of the probability of the partner’s participation in the labour market, 
we abandoned some hypotheses made at the outset. In particular, the information about 
personal characteristics pertains directly to the partner (as opposed to the household 
head), and the definition of working age was differentiated for men (15 - 64) and 
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women (15 - 60). The data about unemployment by category, used as regressor, was 
taken from the SHIW file carcom.
For data on the average salary, which we compared with the value of disability 
benefits, we turned to the file allb1, from which it was possible to calculate the annual 
net income of workers who are not self-employed. To maximise homogeneity we only 
considered individuals employed throughout the year, i.e. excluding seasonal workers.
Having worked exclusively on SHIW data, we used this to calculate the degrees of 
participation and employment which determine the value of expected incomes for all 
the considered groups.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample for income and poverty analysis. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
age 47.33 10.631
male 0.69 0.464
high education 0.43 0.496
low education 0.57 0.496
Centre-North 0.64 0.481
South 0.36 0.481
HH size 3.07 1.254
HH with disabled 0.05 0.220
monthly disability benefits 745.83 456.703
equivalent income 30375.34 18000.900
poverty 0.1560 0.363
intensity 0.3793 0.294
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
Table 2: Summary of the analysis of the discrepancies in equivalised mean income, 
approximated in liras (000), by characteristics of head of household. 
Area Head of HH Eq. mean Y Std. err. Eq. mean Y Std. err. t-test 
All 26792 935.51 30568 291.36 ***
Man 28183 1158.20 31348 355.87 **
Woman 23690 1510.90 28872 503.40 **
High education 31862 1678.81 37726 491.59 **
Low education 25208 1082.67 24868 294.90
All 31193 1169.40 35564 363.22 ***
Man 32627 1437.46 36387 438.19 *
Woman 27689 1871.78 33750 645.02 **
High education 32561 1929.38 41312 599.57 **
Low education 30612 1453.18 30212 366.76
All 20447 1264.57 21683 387.64
Man 21322 1560.64 22278 486.75
Woman 18725 2160.89 20419 627.11
High education 29871 3468.79 29509 739.46
Low education 18768 1268.12 17004 348.95
South
HHD HHND
Nation-wide
Centre-North
Three, two and one starred t values are significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
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Table 3: Diffusion and intensity of poverty among HHD and HHND, according to 
characteristics of head of households.  
Head of HH % Std. err. % Std. err. t-test % Std. err. % Std. err. t-test
All 20.00% 0.028 15.37% 0.006 * 31.34% 0.033 38.39% 0.012
Man 15.86% 0.030 14.30% 0.007 31.19% 0.041 36.85% 0.015
Woman 29.23% 0.057 17.69% 0.011 ** 31.52% 0.055 41.09% 0.021
High education 10.00% 0.043 6.60% 0.006 24.25% 0.115 30.06% 0.026
Low education 23.13% 0.033 22.35% 0.009 32.30% 0.035 40.35% 0.014
Centre-North 8.06% 0.025 5.53% 0.005 22.54% 0.056 33.36% 0.025
South 37.21% 0.052 32.86% 0.012 34.09% 0.039 39.89% 0.014
Diffusion
HHD HHND
Intensity
HHD HHND
Three, two and one starred t values are significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
Table 4: Gini’s concentrati n coefficient for HHD and HHND, calculated on equivalised 
incomes. (Bootstrap estimates). 
Head of HH Observed bias Std. err. Observed bias Std. err.
All 0.2821 -0.0010 0.0116 0.2996 -0.0005 0.0039
Man 0.2752 -0.0007 0.0136 0.2975 0.0003 0.0044
Woman 0.2881 -0.0019 0.0198 0.3026 -0.0006 0.0074
High education 0.2095 -0.0058 0.0244 0.2684 0.0008 0.0056
Low education 0.2971 -0.0022 0.2235 0.2920 -0.0004 0.0048
Centre-North 0.2301 -0.0008 0.0135 0.2548 -0.0011 0.0045
South 0.3155 -0.0047 0.0208 0.3266 -0.0004 0.0062
HHD HHND
Source: our elaboration of SHIW 2000 data 
 
Table 5: HHD and HHND indexes of the measures of poverty calculated on equivalised 
incomes, disability benefits removed. 
Head of HH % Std. err. % Std. err. t-test % Std. err. % Std. err. t-test
All 37.62% 0.034 14.98% 0.006 *** 53.64% 0.037 38.21% 0.012 ***
HHD HHND
Diffusion
HHD HHND
Intensity
Three, two and one starred t values are significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively 
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
Table 6: Replacement ratio. 
Group Man Woman Man Woman
Mean wage (in 000 liras) (a) 29456,83 21177,05 24049,00 19242,27
Mean disability benefits (in 000 liras) (b) 9163,48 9434,25 10644,76 8497,52
Participation rate (%) (c) 7229,00% 51,79 74,82 35,92
1 - unemployment rate (%) (d) 94,13 92,72 75,01 67,97
Expected mean wage (in 000 liras) (e)=(a)*(c)*(d) 20045,88 10456,71 13496,4 4697,64
Replacement Ratio on mean wage (f)= (b)/(a) 0,31 0,43 0,44 0,44
Replacement Ratio on Expected mean wage (g)=(b)/(e) 0,46 0,9 0,79 1,81
Centre-North South
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for analysis of partners’ participation. 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Age individual age 44,76 9,44
Gender individual gender 0,20 0,40
North area of residence 0,43 0,50
Centre area of residence 0,20 0,40
South area of residence 0,37 0,48
High high education level 0,09 0,29
Medium medium education level 0,32 0,47
Low low education level 0,59 0,49
Schooling years of schooling 9,50 4,12
Children 0-5 presence of children 0-5 years old 0,19 0,39
Children 6-14 presence of children 6-14 years old 0,33 0,47
Elderly presence of elderly 0,08 0,27
Disabled members presence of disabled members 0,03 0,17
Unemployment rate unemployment rate 0,10 0,12
Unearned income not labour income 14748,57 18473,03
Husband income husband earning 27561,66 23170,02
Own income predicted partners earning 12274,35 8127,11
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
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Table 8: Heckman Model estimates. 
Covariates Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Sign
age 2856.98 282.12 0.000 ***
age square -35.02 3.17 0.000 ***
gender 9172.69 1392.94 0.000 ***
north 2445.10 760.23 0.001 ***
south -1554.91 962.01 0.106
high 8775.80 1013.58 0.000 ***
low -8877.00 862.10 0.000 ***
constant -39877.51 6361.13 0.000 ***
age 0.032 0.027 0.243
age square 0.000 0.000 0.119
gender 2.125 0.095 0.000 ***
north 0.176 0.060 0.004 ***
south -0.537 0.071 0.000 ***
high 0.753 0.105 0.000 ***
low -0.705 0.053 0.000 ***
children 0-5 -0.149 0.071 0.035 **
children 6-14 -0.037 0.055 0.505
elderly 0.155 0.086 0.072 *
disabled persons -0.163 0.125 0.192
unemployment rate -1.106 0.315 0.000 ***
constant 0.224 0.613 0.715
lambda 4801.82 1873.51 0.010 ***
rho 0.32
Censored Uncensored
Observation 4236 1665 2571
Wald chi2(14) 1235.21
Prob>chi2 0.00
Selection equation
Earning equation
Three, two and one starred t values are significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
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Table 9: Logit Model estimates. 
Observations 4236
LR chi2 (14) 1547,77
Prob>chi2 0,000
Pseudo R2 0,2653
Log-Likelihood -2143,56
Correctly classified 74,48%
Covariates Coef. Std. Err. signific. Mfx
age 0,165 0,069 ** 0,039947
age square -0,002 0,001 *** -0,000603
gender 2,176 0,199 *** 0,411467
north -0,024 0,111 -0,005871
south -0,780 0,120 *** -0,189550
schooling 0,111 0,027 *** 0,026855
children 0-5 -0,374 0,116 *** -0,091967
children 6-14 -0,314 0,090 *** -0,076573
elderly 0,385 0,150 *** 0,089862
disabled persons -0,019 0,219 -0,004595
unemployment rate -0,838 0,498 * -0,202950
no labor income -0,000011 0,000 *** -0,000003
husband income -0,000007 0,000 *** -0,000002
own income 0,000066 0,000 *** 0,000016
constant -3,252 1,477 **
Participation Equation
Three, two and one starred t values are significant at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
Table 10: Observed and predicted participation rates. 
all disabled no disabled
Predicted 0.589 0.352 0.596
Observed 0.547 0.370 0.552
Household
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
Table 11: Elasticities. 
all disabled no disabled
Substitution 0.33 0.31 0.33
Cross-substitution -0.08 -0.10 -0.08
Income -0.07 -0.12 -0.07
Household
Source: our elaboration of SHIW (2000) data. 
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